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Abstract—The increasing use of information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) in electricity grid infrastructures facilitates
improved energy generation, transmission, and distribution.
However, smart grids are still in their infancy with a disparate
regional role out. Due to the involved costs utility providers
are only embedding ICT in selected parts of the grid, thereby
creating only partial smart grid infrastructures. We argue that
using the data provided by these partial smart grid deployments
can still be beneficial in solving various issues such as energy
theft detection. In this paper, we focus on various data-driven
techniques to detect energy theft in power networks. These data-
driven detection techniques (at the smart meter as well as the
aggregated level) can indicate various forms of energy theft (e.g.
through clandestine connections or meter tampering). This paper
also presents two case studies to show the effectiveness of these
approaches.
Index Terms—Energy theft, smart grid, data analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, electrical energy grids have undergone amajor modernization process leading to improved energy
generation, transmission, and distribution. Modern energy grid
infrastructures are referred to as smart grids, since they allow
a more resilient, secure, and reliable electricity supply for
end-users while enabling a more fine grained control and
better adjusted demand response, and targeted intervention
in the face of challenges [1]. The Electric Power Research
Institute (EPRI) predicts that a fully developed smart grid
can save anywhere between $1.3 to $2 trillion, in comparison
to the deployment costs, which are between $338 and $476
billion over 20 years [2]. According to the Global Smart
Grid Federation Report, the deployment of smart meters alone
would save up to $5 billion in Australia and £7.3 billion
in the UK in the next two decades [3]. However, given the
high investment required and the amount of existing legacy
equipment, the adoption of smart grids has not been uniform
across the globe, despite their well-recognized benefits.
Whilst the maturity of smart grid deployments in devel-
oped nations has made significant progress in the past few
years [4], developing countries still rely on less sophisticated
infrastructures. These typically make use of information and
communication technology (ICT) at just the consumption level
with some automation in the transmission and distribution
level. However, it can still be effectively used for carrying
out important tasks such as accounting, optimization and theft
detection.
Energy theft, in particular, causes major losses for grid
utility providers. Due to theft, utility providers lose $89.3
billion annually worldwide [5]. Proportionally these losses
are comparatively high in developing countries. For example,
$58.7 billion of such losses occur in developing markets [5].
In this paper we argue that, even in partial smart grid
deployment scenarios, data-driven techniques (based on the
collection of data at only a single level) can be useful for
tackling the problem of energy theft detection. Hence, it is
useful to consider such techniques on different granularity
of data collection levels. The major contributions of the
study presented in this paper are summarized as follows:
the different viewpoints on data-driven techniques used for
theft detection in smart grids are presented, highlighting the
usefulness of such techniques. We present detailed case-
studies at different levels of granularity using available real-
world data. This study shows how data-driven techniques
can be used to identify energy theft, even in less-advanced
infrastructure deployments.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe related data-driven schemes to automatically
detect anomalies in energy consumption profiles, which can
be used to detect energy theft. In Section III, the background
on smart grid infrastructure and smart metering is presented.
Section describes the datasets used and methodology followed
in order to detect energy theft using data-driven analysis.
In Section V, we present case studies evaluation. Finally, in
Section VI we discuss final remarks and provide an outlook.
II. RELATED WORK
Energy losses can occur due to technical problems or non-
technical issues. While the former is usually caused by physi-
cal factors during energy distribution, the latter is mainly due
to energy theft [6]. An important approach to mitigate theft
is to use data-driven energy theft detection mechanisms that
rely on energy consumption measurements. The data can be
gathered by smart meters that are deployed in each household
as well as from smart meter gateways on the aggregate level at
either a regional (e.g. city-wide) or a neighborhood microgrid
level. In general, data-driven schemes can be further classified
into smart meter profiling and aggregate profiling on the basis
of considered level of granularity. In the following, the main
research in this area is being introduced.
A. Smart Meter Energy Consumption Profiling
Smart meter energy consumption profiling is the basis for
energy theft detection mechanisms that rely on statistical
data-driven methods to characterize the normal behavior of
consumers. These methods can be used to identify unusual
energy utilisation, i.e., to accurately localize energy theft.
In regard to this, Singh et al. [7] utilised the concept of
relative entropy to track the energy consumption variations
in probability distributions obtained from different consumers.
In another approach, Jokar et al. [8] utilised the consumers’
consumption patterns to detect theft in the Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure (AMI) by modelling the predictability in
customers’ usual and abnormal consumption behaviours. In
previous work [9], we have developed a scheme to detect
the anomalous behaviour in smart homes using smart meter
data. To this end, metrics were derived from each energy
measurement, such as Renyi entropy and the mean time
and frequency marginals, and used within a simple k-means
clustering scheme [9]. Although, such data-driven techniques
are aiding towards capturing the partial non-stationarity in the
smart meter measurements which could be crucial in energy
theft detection. However, its underlying statistical foundations
needs to be solid to adequately map such non-stationary
measurements into meaningful statistical metrics.
B. Aggregate Energy Consumption Profiling
The combined use of aggregate-level with smart meter-level
profiling schemes can arguably enrich the overall character-
ization of normal power consumption in power distribution
networks, thus strengthening the basis for detecting outliers
that could relate to the energy theft phenomena. In this regard,
Jindal et al. [6] analysed the aggregated data of multiple
households to detect energy theft in the local communities
with high accuracy. Their study used decision trees to compute
a predicted energy consumption values for the household and
then trained the support vector machine (SVM) with multiple
feature sets to find consumers with anomalous behaviour.
Pulz et al. [10] used the social indicators extracted from the
census data to analyse the correlation between losses and
socio-economic indices for energy theft detection. Apart from
using machine learning approaches, Leite and Mantovani [11]
devised a non-technical loss detection mechanism by monitor-
ing the variance of various regional values using multivariate
control chart. Xiao and Ai [12] proposed an energy theft
detection method on the basis of random matrix theory model
to identify the correlations between power consumption and
system operation under various scenarios of electricity usage.
These schemes show that aggregated data-driven ap-
proaches are useful to identify anomalous behavior of con-
sumers. However, aggregated energy consumption measure-
ments are high in volume and non-stationary [9]. Therefore,
a statistical energy consumption profiling scheme needs to
address these challenges to compose useful clusters.
III. SMART GRID INFRASTRUCTURE
A smart grid is an enhanced version of the traditional
electrical energy grid. In addition to transmission lines, sub-
stations, transformers, and other physical equipment, the smart
grid includes an ICT infrastructure that is used to enable
enhanced monitoring, control and adaptation functions. How-
ever, in the present deployment of smart grids, ICT is not
embedded at every level of the grid. This scenario is more
common in developing countries, where ICT is only enabled
at the facilities like substations, end-user, etc, due to the
fact that embedding ICT at every level can be too costly. A
simplified view of a high-level grid architecture, showing its
major components for data collection, is presented in Fig. 1.
Figure 1: High-level view of the smart grid architecture.
The generation level include, wide area measurement sys-
tems (WAMSs) and other high voltage (HV) sensors which
gather the data, while the transmission level includes HV
sensors, phasor measurement unit (PMU) and wireless area
network (WAN) communication infrastructure [13]. The dis-
tribution level in smart grid comprise of low voltage (LV)
sensors, sensor and actuator networks (SANETs) and WANs
to gather and communicate the data, whereas the end-users (or
consumers including various sectors such as residential, com-
mercial and industrial) have Advanced Metering Infrastructure
(AMI), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
and home area networks (HANs) [13]. A significant part of the
ICT infrastructure deployed in smart grid architecture is the
SCADA and AMI systems which are present on the end-user
level of the grid network. These are distributed systems that
are used to monitor, control, and manage automated processes
and components in the energy grid. Apart from SCADA,
the substations are also equipped with automation front-
end, which provide a level of automation to the distribution
substations. It is to be noted that the grid automation at
sub-station and higher level does not contribute much to the
purpose of detecting theft (which happens more at the end-user
level). Moreover, the widespread roll out of SCADA and AMI
systems at the end-user level makes them better candidates for
data analysis as they gather variety of data at very short time
intervals. More specifically, for the purposes of detecting and
preventing energy theft across the grid, the systems deployed
at end-user level such as SCADA and AMI in smart grid
architecture alleviates the need of a fully embedded ICT into
each and every level of the energy network. This can be done
by performing a data-driven analysis at at different granular
levels of data collection in order to detect energy theft in the
electricity networks.
IV. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION
To show the effectiveness of the data-driven techniques for
identifying the energy theft, two case studies on different
granularity levels of energy consumption profiling with partial
ICT deployment in smart grids are discussed.
A. Case study 1: Smart meter energy consumption profiling
In this, the public residential dataset from Dutch Residential
Energy Dataset (DRED) is considered [14]. This dataset
consists of data collected from several sensors that measure
energy, occupancy and ambient conditions in a household for
a six months period from 5th July to 5th December 2015 (http:
//www.st.ewi.tudelft.nl/akshay/dred/). Details of this dataset
are given in Table I with the frequency of collection.
Table I: DRED Dataset
Dataset Description Frequency
Aggregated Aggregated consumption with date, time 1 Hz
Appliance Appliance level consumption with date, time 1 Hz
BT Beacon values sensed every 1 minute by
the occupant’s mobile phone. The details
include Date, Time, Id, RSSI, Temperature,
BatteryLevel, Proximity, Location
1 min
Wi-Fi Access points RSSI values sensed every 1
minute by the occupant’s mobile phone. The
details include Date, Time, MAC id, AP
name, RSSI
1 min
Temperature Indoor and outdoor temperature with date,
time, location
1 min
Occupancy Occupancy data inferred using RSSI local-
ization mechanisms with Date, Time, Loca-
tion
1 min
This dataset monitored the consumption patterns of the
appliances in a household along with the ambiance and
environmental factors. The histogram of the mostly used
appliances in the considered household is shown in Fig. 2.
Figure 2: Histogram of different appliance loads (from [14]).
A critical way to detect anomaly/theft in the consumption
at this level is to statistically analyse and profile the energy
measurements in terms of their frequency components as






where, x(j) is the time domain signal (j=0. . .n-1), y(z) rep-
resents the transformed signal in frequency domain (z=0. . .n-
1), and n is the length of the input signal. Other statistical
methods can also be used in conjunction to the above for
deeper analysis such as entropy of signals can be effectively
examined for identifying any unusual variations [15]. In this
case study, the spectral entropy of the signal is analysed which




P (t, n) log2 P (t, n) (2)
where, H(t) is the spectral entropy at time t in time-frequency
domain, P (t, n) is probability distribution of the signal S(t, n)
(where S(t, n) = |F (t, n)|2) and F (t, n) is the discrete
Fourier transform of the original signal.
B. Case study 2: Aggregated energy consumption profiling
In this case study, load demand from various homes is
considered from the Open Energy Information dataset [16].
It contains the electric consumption data for various homes
and appliances with respect to date and time for one year. A
snippet of this dataset for a typical day’s load in winter is
illustrated in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Energy consumption of various appliances.
200 homes from the given dataset were chosen at random
in this case study for aggregated analysis of the consumption
profiles. For the purpose of detecting theft using aggregated
consumption profiling, a simplistic k-means clustering model
was chosen to compute the baseline profiles. The premise be-
hind using k-means clustering is that each consumer consump-
tion profile would conform to a certain cluster consumption
curve as similar households have similar energy usage pattern
[17]. Initially, each consumption profile is assigned to a cluster
profile at random after which the mean of the cluster centroid
is computed. Then, each profile is re-assigned to the clusters
on the basis of their closeness to the new cluster centroid.
This closeness is given by the gap between the consumption






(hi − µi)2 (3)
where, h represents the consumption value of a home and µ
depicts cluster centroids respectively, and N is the size of a
cluster. This process is repeated until the value of a centroid
converges. After the successful generation of the baseline
profiles, the energy consumption profiles of the households
can be compared with these baseline models in order to find
out any deviations from the normal.
V. CASE STUDIES AND EVALUATION
The evaluation of the results pertaining to the case studies
presented in the prior section, to show the effectiveness of
data-driven techniques, are discussed in detail as follows.
A. Case study 1: Smart meter energy consumption profiling
As the dataset described in Section IV-A does not have any
record of energy theft, therefore, we have simulated a theft
scenario by injecting synthetic anomalies for the purpose of
identifying energy theft in this case study. The hypothesis for
this synthetic injection is that an attacker tampers with the
home energy management system of his neighbourhood to
reduce the value of energy consumption reported from his/her
household [6]. The premise behind this hypothesis is that the
attacker would spread a share of his appliance measurements
through the similar appliances in other legitimate households
in order to avoid detection by keeping the overall energy
consumption to the actual value. For this purpose, we injected
false data values (to decrease the load) for a customer for
a single type of load (i.e., fridge) and compared with the
Fourier-based transformation of the injected data with the
consumption data of the legitimate customer. An illustration of
the FFT-transformation of the normal load profiles of various
appliances in a home is depicted in Fig. 4. It is possible
through the detailed examination of the coefficients of the
Fourier-based transformations from the appliance consumption
profiles to identify whether extremely high frequencies are
present within the dataset.
Figure 4: FFT coefficients of the appliances in DRED dataset.
By assessing the resulting transformations (from the normal
and injected data) in terms of the appliance-specific measure-
ments, we identified that there were slight variations in the
injected data, which reflects on the possibility of theft. In
order to further validate the hypothesis, the spectral entropy
of the signals is analyzed as mentioned in Section IV-A. This
analysis revealed some major changes in the spectral entropy
of the normal and injected data in the appliance at particular
time-slots (which portray theft) where the consumption values
were modified as seen in Fig. 5. Therefore, we argue that it is
possible to filter out the anomalous behavior of the customers
using data-driven techniques and manually associate their
power measurements with other aspects related to them.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: Spectral frequency analysis of the appliance.
B. Case study 2: Aggregated energy consumption profiling
Using the k-means clustering model presented in Section
IV-B, the consumption profiles of various homes are modeled
into different clusters on the basis of the historic data. The
output depicts various average consumption profiles which
serve as baselines profiles for theft detection. For example,
a model for computing the baseline profiles in 200 homes
using different number of cluster centroids is depicted in Fig.
6. This figure shows the baseline curves computed for one day
using the historic data.
Figure 6: Cluster formation with different number of cluster
centroids a) C=2 b) C=4 c) C=6 d) C=8 (adapted from [17]).
It can be seen in Fig. 6 that centroids with 4 cluster
profiles are able to successfully give different load profiles
that do not overlap with each other unlike the case with
other cluster profiles. Thus, these could serve as the baseline
load profiles for theft detection. To check if there is theft
or not, the first step is to compare the load profile of the
household with the baseline curves. Once the baseline curve
is identified for a particular household, the anomaly can be
identified if the consumption profile deviates for more than,
say, 10%. An example of this comparison is shown in Fig. 7
where two scenarios are presented. The first scenario depicts
the normal load consumption of the household, while in the
second scenario, we injected false values (for simulating theft
scenario) in order to reduce the reported energy consumption.
One of the scenarios (normal load profile) shows that the
actual consumption conforms to the baseline pattern whereas
the other scenario depicts anomaly in the consumption pattern
of the household as it deviates from the baseline curve. In
this case, it can be inferred that the load pattern from 7am
to 9am and 7pm to 9pm does not conform to the rest of the
curve. Therefore, it can be said that this method successfully
identified the time slots where false data values were injected.
(a) Normal load profile (b) Anomalous load profile
Figure 7: Analysis of the baseline model with actual values.
C. Discussion
The techniques we presented provide an insight on the
importance of adequately characterizing the energy consump-
tion at two major granularity levels (i.e., smart meter and
aggregate level). We argue that a building block towards
energy theft detection is the data-driven composition of energy
consumption profiling schemes that are able to flag anomalous
patterns. Due to the dependency of raw energy consumption
measurements (either on the smart meter or aggregate-level)
on several factors (e.g., temperature, humidity, and time of the
year) that do not necessarily relate to the grid infrastructure,
we suggest that such data-driven schemes should be broad and
sophisticated enough to consider such factors. Moreover, the
mathematical formulation of such schemes should also be able
to conform with the highly dynamic and non-stationary nature
of such measurements. Consequently, the resulting granular
profiling of energy consumption would then be much more
accurate and provide the ability to identify the root cause
of an observed anomalous pattern. Overall, our case studies
demonstrated the potential of identifying energy theft, a major
challenge across the globe that could be intelligently con-
fronted by employing data-driven schemes in conjunction with
smart meters/AMIs that exist in a modern grid infrastructure.
We showed here that how data at two granularity levels
can be analysed and through correlation with additional (or
situational) data, one might be able to develop a viable energy
theft detection system.
However, other aspects also have to be addressed in the
future. The data protection, the protection of privacy and the
prevention of data misuse are all elements that have to be
addressed when making use of data-driven schemes. While
it is important that energy theft is identified and stopped,
it is equally important that the data is not misused for any
other purposes. Other, non-technical, aspects also have to be
investigated, e.g., related to urban design and socio-economic
circumstances alongside wider infrastructure and community
resilience aspects.
VI. CONCLUSION
Modern energy grid infrastructures (i.e. smart grids) offer
improved energy generation, transmission, and distribution.
However, the adoption of smart grids has not been uniform
across the globe. While more developed nations are heavily
investing in the modernization of their power grids, developing
countries have a more patchy smart grid deployment. In
this paper various data-driven techniques are investigated and
applied to a set of relevant case studies to show how they
can be used for the detection of electricity theft in smart
grid infrastructures. In particular we discussed two data-driven
energy theft detection schemes, at the smart meter level as
well as at an aggregate level. We argue that the combination of
per-household energy measurements as collected by individual
smart meters and as aggregate measurements can be used to
reliably identify anomalous measurements. Such anomalies
can, for example, indicate the establishment of a clandestine
connection or even meter tampering, which are common forms
of energy theft.
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